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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1    Introduction 
Agriculture was once the leading sector in the Thai economy. The crop 
production sub-sector was and remains the core of Thai agriculture. An 
important crop production is rice. In the 1850’s the country was rapidly 
increasing specialization in rice production for exports. The major buyers of 
Thai rice at that time were the European countries. Before 1855, the Western 
countries including the United States of America and Britain, tried to conclude 
the treaty of friendship and commerce with Thailand in order to guarantee their 
increasing trade interests. In 1821, the East India Company appointed John 
Crawford as an envoy to the court of Thailand, hoping that he would be able to 
sign a treaty with Thailand. The mission, however, was unsuccessful. In 1850, 
the British Plenipotentiary, Sir James Brooke of Sarawak, went to Thailand with 
the purpose of negotiating a treaty, but he failed. Brooke was followed by the 
American Ballestier who also failed. In 1855, the British Plenipotentiary had 
advised its government that only gunboat diplomacy would bring the Thais to 
accept a Treaty between Britain and Thailand. King Mongkut (Rama IV) of 
Thailand realized that the age of isolation for Thailand was over.  Thailand 
received the British mission led by Sir John Bowring who negotiated a Treaty 
between the two countries.  After the signing of the Bowring Treaty in 1855, 
Thailand's international trade expanded and it began to employ both land and 
labour more intensively.  Foreign trade became the engine of growth and the 
Thai economy became more dependent on rice crop. After 1880, the 
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development of modern transportation and telecommunication networks, 
especially the connection of telecommunication of Bangkok with the world, 
played an important role in the growth of rice exports.   
 
The increase in foreign demand for rice which led to rising prices, stimulated 
the rapid expansion of rice farming. The economic expansion in the late 
Nineteenth Century can largely be attributed to the production of rice, which 
accounted for two-thirds of the total exports. During the second half of the 
Nineteenth Century and the early Twentieth Century, Thai farmers produced an 
increasing amount of marketable rice, in spite of low innovations in rice 
production. Facilitated by the availability of land and with simple traditional 
farming tools, Thai farmers could produce more rice for sale by working harder 
and extending the area of cultivation. Although there was no significant change 
in rice farming technology, farmers made adjustments according to available 
resources to increase their efficiency. Manarungran (1989:19) stated that 
although there was no technological innovation among Thai farmers, their 
labour productivity before 1950 was higher than that of their counterparts from 
other countries. During 1920-1950 labour productivity of Thai rice farming was 
3.44 kilograms per man-hour. In contrast, labour productivity of Japanese rice 
farmers was 2.35 kilograms per man-hour. Japan was land-scarce and labour-
abundant country, which was much more advanced than Thailand in terms of 
their rice-farming technology but had lower labour productivity. Unfortunately, 
Thailand’s advantage over other countries had declined considerably since 
then because of decreasing labour productivity in rice farming.  Rice output 
during crop years 1996/1997-2003/2004 had averaged 402 kilograms per rai 
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while the average output in other rice producing countries was higher, Vietnam, 
for example the average rice output was 582 kilograms per rai. This is because 
the quality of Thai rice is of a higher quality resulting in a lower yield. However, 
rice has been Thailand’s important cash crop, earning as much as 70 billion 
baht each year in the nineties. Thailand produced 6 million metric tons of rice 
per year, Thailand is also currently the world’s biggest rice exporter. The 
important markets for Thai rice are Asian countries, especially those in the 
Asia-Pacific region, such as China and Hong Kong. Other important markets 
are the Middle East, the United States of America and Africa.  In terms of 
quality, more than 60 percent of the rice exports are high quality rice while the 
remaining are of medium and low quality. The quality of the rice exported is 
classified according to the following: 
 
1)  The good or high quality rice is 100 percent white rice and it refers to rice 
with no broken grains.  Sixty percent of Thai exports are from high quality 
rice. The rice that Thailand is most famous for is hom mali rice.  This 
variety comprises more than 80 percent of all high quality rice exported.  
This type of rice is exported to China, Hong Kong, Iran, the United States 
of America and Singapore.  
 
2)  The medium quality rice which has 10-15 percent of broken grains, 
contributes to only 5 percent of Thai rice exports.  The major countries 
importing this variety are Indonesia, Malaysia and some African countries.  
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3)  The low quality rice includes the type with more than 20 percent broken 
grains and parboiled rice.  Currently this variety of rice comprises 35 
percent of Thai rice exports and it is exported to Africa and the Middle 
East. 
 
Although Thailand is still the current leading rice exporter in the world, its share 
in the world rice market has been declining. There is increased competition 
from other exporting countries for all varieties of rice. Vietnam and China are 
two important competitors producing low quality rice. The labour costs in these 
two countries are comparatively lower. Other problems faced by Thai farmers 
are the low level of technology in rice production and producing rice of uneven 
quality.  
 
To alleviate these problems, Thailand needs to re-double its efforts to develop 
high quality rice to export to those countries with higher purchasing power.  The 
market for this type of rice is more stable than those for rice of medium and low 
qualities.  Thailand should also start improving its medium and low quality rice, 
so that their export values can increase. The government has since carried out 
several schemes to improve the quality of rice production. Some of the 
programs or policies which were implemented to help increase Thai rice 
exports include the following.   
1)   Implement “Good Agricultural Practices” (GAP) in order to produce high 
quality, chemical-free rice.  This is already practised in many developed 
countries in Europe.   
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2)   Develop rice packages in forms and sizes which suit the tastes of 
consumers in importing countries. 
3)   Affix labels on packages providing details such as nutrient values and the 
proper or recommended way to cook the rice for those who are not 
familiar with cooking rice.  
4)   Promote and facilitate the production of rice variety with potential growth 
in sales such as steamed rice.  This variety is in fact the low quality rice.  
This rice variety still has the potential for export earnings especially from 
markets in developing countries. 
 
One of the advantages that Thailand has in the production of rice is the high 
work rate of the Thai farmers. These farmers have been growing rice for a long 
time.  In the Thai rice sector, there are still a significant number of farmers. 
During crop years 1982/1993-1995/1996 for example, an average of 75 percent 
of farmers in agriculture were engaged in rice farming. Unfortunately, Thai 
farmers suffer from low productivity even though they are hard working. If these 
farmers are efficiently utilized there will be increased potential for growth in rice 
farming. 
 
As labour utilization is crucial in Thai rice farming, research and empirical 
studies on this issue are necessary. There should be studies to see if the 
workforce is efficiently utilized. The findings of such studies will have important 
implications especially for planners who design and implement policies to 
improve the competitiveness of Thai rice.  
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This study is primarily on the efficiency of the use of labour force in rice farming 
in Thailand. This is an important issue since Thailand is still considered an 
agricultural country.  The sector is the most important sector for creating 
employment for the growing labour force. On average, 49.38 percent of 
employment in Thailand were in the agricultural sector during the period 1990-
2000.  However, as stated earlier, research and empirical studies on labour 
productivity in rice farming are lacking. It is imperative to examine the efficiency 
of labour usage in order to provide useful information for stakeholders.  With 
this knowledge on labour productivity, they will make better decisions to 
allocate resource use in rice farming including labour input.  
 
Aside from studying on labour productivity of farmers, this study hopes to 
analyze the contribution of input growth and Total Factor Productivity in rice 
farming. It will provide an understanding about the main sources of rice output 
growth, including the role of technological progress. The contribution of each 
input growth in the growth of rice output and the substitution possibilities 
between labour and land use in rice farming will help towards planning for 
optimizing the combination of capital and labour utilization. 
 
The following section gives an overview of the Thai economy.  The structural 
changes of the Thai economy, including a detailed analysis of the development 
of the agricultural sector are then presented.  This is followed by a discussion 
of the productivity of workers in rice farming. The Chapter concludes by setting 
out the research problem, the objectives of the study and the tentative chapter 
scheme.  
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1.2    The Thai Economy 
During the period 1961-2004, the GDP of Thailand grew at an impressive 
average rate of was 6.8 percent (see Table 1.1).  Nevertheless, Thailand is still 
considered a developing agricultural country. To trace the country’s economic 
development, the important macro economic indicators are presented in this 
section. They include population, GDP, per capita income, non-agricultural 
income, trade balance, exports and imports, balance of payments and currency 
exchange rates. Additionally, interest rate, inflation rate and rate of 
unemployment are also discussed.  
 
 
Planning for economic development became a formal process of the Thai 
government in 1961 when the National Economic Development Board 
(NESDB) was established.  The Thai Economic Plan achieved an impressive 
growth rate of 8.1 percent during the First Development Plan (1961-1966).  
However, the Second Development Plan (1967-1971) witnessed a decline in 
growth rate.  The average GDP growth rate was 7.8 percent although it was 
projected to reach more than 8 percent. The slowdown in overall growth 
reflected a decline in foreign investments, reduced US military spending, and 
the disappointing performance in agriculture, which grew at only 4.5 percent 
during the period.  The decline in the growth of agriculture was due partly to the 
droughts of 1967 and 1968, and partly to the fluctuation in world prices of major 
export commodities.  
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Table 1.1:  GDP Growth Rates of Thailand, 1961-2004 
 
Year GDP Growth rate (%) 
1961 7.2 
1971 8.6 
1981 5.6 
1991 8.6 
1992 8.1 
1993 8.3 
1994 9.0 
1995 9.2 
1996 5.9 
1997 -1.4 
1998 -10.5 
1999 4.4 
2000 4.8 
2001 2.2 
2002 5.3 
2003 7.0 
2004 6.2 
2005 4.5 
Period Average 
1961-1966 8.1 
1967-1971 7.8 
1972-1976 6.5 
1977-1981 7.4 
1982-1986 5.4 
1987-1991 10.9 
1992-1996 10.0 
1997-2001 -0.2 
2002-2005 5.7 
 
Source:   Bank of Thailand. Thailand’s Key Economic Indicators, various years. 
 
 
 
Between 1972 and 1986, the government promoted the manufacturing sector 
by implementing an industrial-oriented policy. The Third Plan (1972-1976) saw 
a disappointing GDP average growth rate of only 6.5 percent.  The main 
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causes of this less than expected growth rate during this period were the 1973-
74 oil crisis, the resultant world economic slump and the continued decline in 
US military spending. The slowdown was also partly attributable to the poor 
performance in agriculture, which grew at only 3.9 percent.  In spite of the 
expansion in the manufacturing sector, it was evident that it was still not 
creating enough jobs. Between 1972 and 1982, for example, the rate of 
investment was as high as 20 percent while the rate of employment was only 
12 percent. Further, in 2003 the manufacturing sector contributed 36 percent in 
GDP, but it contributed only 15 percent to employment. Even though migration 
from rural to urban areas was rapid and clearly visible, it was widely thought 
that the benefits such as employment and higher income of manufacturing 
were not reaching the majority of the population. 
 
The performance of the economy during the Fourth Development Plan (1977-
1981) was affected by the rapidly changing world economic conditions, 
particularly the rising oil prices, high interest rates and declining demand and 
prices of commodity exports. In spite of the unfavorable external conditions, the 
economy expanded satisfactorily, enjoying an average growth rate of 7.4 
percent. 
 
The Fifth Development Plan (1982-1986) continued to give high priority to 
economic restructuring, the maintenance of financial stability and the welfare of 
the rural poor. This period coincided with slower growth as a result of the world 
recession of the early 1980s.  Largely as a result of the international oil price 
increases of the 1970s and early 1980s, Thailand suffered a severe 
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deterioration in its terms of trade. The overall growth rate of 5.4 percent was 
the lowest compared to all the earlier plans. The Thai macroeconomic policy 
was adjusted sharply to counter the imbalances described above. The 
adjustments included a significant fiscal contraction. The fiscal deficit was 
transformed into a surplus, equivalent to 1.3 percent of the GDP in fiscal year 
1988 and 4.9 percent in 1990.  At the same time, Thailand was experiencing an 
export boom in manufactured products. 
 
The Thai economy soared in the next two Development Plans and enjoyed high 
annual growth rates of 10.9 percent and 10 percent in the Sixth and Seventh 
Development Plans respectively.  However, the economic growth rate fell 
drastically to -0.2 percent during the Eighth Development Plan due to the 
financial crisis in 1997-1998. Nevertheless, Thailand survived the economic 
crisis by earning foreign income through exports and tourism. Thailand 
experienced an annual growth rate of 5.9 percent in 2002-2005. However, the 
tourism industry was adversely affected in 2004 due to the Tsunami. Thailand 
is expected to reach 4.5-5 percentage of growth in 2006. 
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Table 1.2:  Key Economic Indicators of Thailand, 1991-2004 
 
Year 
Population 
(million) 
GNP (billion Baht) GNP Per 
Capita (Baht)Agriculture Non-Agriculture Total 
1990 54.55 363.6 1,681.8 1,945.4 38,613 
1991 57.37 282.7 1,829.1 2,111.9 43,655 
1992 58.03 296.3 1,986.3 2,285.6 48,311 
1993 58.34 289.1 2,181.8 2,470.9 53,772 
1994 59.10 303.4 2,389.6 2,693.0 60,865 
1995 59.46 276.6 2,665.1 2,941.7 69,326 
1996 60.63 288.8 2,826.5 3,115.3 75,146 
1997 60.81 286.8 2,785.8 3,072.6 76,057 
1998 61.45 282.6 2,467.1 2,749.7 72,979 
1999 61.66 289.2 2,582.8 2,872.0 72,981 
2000 61.88 309.9 2,698.5 3,008.4 77,863 
2001 62.31 320.0 2,753.6 3,073.6 80,558 
2002 63.46 322.2 2,914.2 3,237.0 84,919 
2003 64.00 359.0 3,108.5 3,464.7 91,398 
2004 65.08 341.8 3,336.7 3,678.5 99,339 
 
Source:   Bank of Thailand (2005).  Thailand’s Key Economic Indicators. 
 
 
 
The Thai economy during 1990-1996 grew at an average of 8 percent per year. 
It was driven mainly by the non-agricultural sectors. From Table 1.1, it can be 
seen that the Thai economy had fallen into a period of depression after the 
financial crisis of 1997. In 1997 and 1998, the country’s economic growth rates 
were -1.4 percent and  -10.5 percent respectively. As a direct consequence of 
the economic difficulties, the country’s average economic growth rate during 
the Eighth Development Plan (1997-2001) was -0.2 percent. Since then, 
however, the Thai economy had recovered. In 2002, the growth rate improved 
to 5.3 percent and by 2003, it further increased to 7.0 percent. However the 
Thai economy slowed down again in the beginning of 2004 to 2005. It 
decreased from 6.2 to 4.5 percent, respectively. This is mainly due to the 
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adverse impact of the global economic slump on the external sector. Further, 
cost of production increased because of  the higher petroleum price. Income 
earned from tourism also declined since the Tsunami disaster in December of 
2004.  
 
The most serious negative impact of the 1997 financial crisis on the country’s 
economy was the closure of as many as 58 investment and trust companies as 
well as 1 commercial bank.  Because of the adverse liquidity situation, 
investment in the agricultural sector became stagnant.  Private businesses 
faced so much financial difficulties that they had to reduce production, resulting 
in the retrenchment of thousands of workers.  Many workers who shifted from 
the agricultural sector to the urban areas during the pre-crisis period had to 
move back to farming and other agricultural activities.  (This will be discussed 
in greater detail in Section 1.3.)   
 
The actual population growth rate during the 5 years of the Eighth Development 
Plan averaged 0.6 percent a year.  The low growth rate was about the same as 
forecasted in the Plan.  However, despite the crisis, GNP per capita grew at a 
satisfactory rate of 0.2 percent per year for 2000-2001.  It increased from 
76,057 baht in 1997 to 80,558 baht in 2001 (see Table 1.2). Also, growth of the 
agricultural sector income exceeded that of the non-agricultural sector income 
after 1997.  For instance, in 2000, income growth rate of the agricultural sector 
increased to 7.2 percent from 2.3 percent in 1999. In contrast, the income 
growth rate of the non-agricultural sectors in 2000 decreased to 4.5 percent 
from 4.7 percent in 1999 (see Table 1.3). 
 
 13
Table 1.3:  Income Growth Rates by Sector, 1990-2004 (percent) 
 
Year GDP Growth Rate  
Agricultural 
Sector 
Non-Agricultural 
Sectors  
1990 11.2 -4.7 14.1 
1991 8.6 7.3 8.8 
1992 8.1 4.8 8.6 
1993 8.3 -2.4 9.8 
1994 9.0 5.0 9.5 
1995 9.2 4.0 9.8 
1996 5.9 4.4 6.1 
1997 -1.4 -0.7 -1.4 
1998 -10.5 -1.5 -11.4 
1999 4.4 2.3 4.7 
2000 4.8 7.2 4.5 
2001 2.2 3.2 2.0 
2002 5.3 0.7 5.9 
2003 7.0 11.4 6.5 
2004 6.2 -4.8 7.4 
 
Source:   Bank of Thailand (2005). Thailand’s Key Economic Indicators. 
 
 
 
The inflation rate during 1991-1996 averaged 5 percent.  It was well below the 
economic growth rate. It can be seen from Table 1.4 that the country’s inflation 
rate was extremely high after the financial crisis of 1997.  In 1998, the inflation 
rate soared to 8.1 percent. The crisis caused a decline in investment in the 
non-agricultural sectors. This decline led to a supply shortage. Price of goods 
and services as well as the cost of imported capital or intermediate goods rose 
significantly. This led to a contraction in aggregate demand for all goods and 
services. However, since 1999, the inflation rate has fallen steadily (see Table 
1.4). The combination of lower oil prices and domestic economic slowdown 
caused inflation to decline steadily. 
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Table 1.4:  Inflation Rate of the Thai Economy, 1991-2003 
 
Year Inflation Rate (%) 
1991 5.7 
1992 4.1 
1993 3.4 
1994 5.0 
1995 5.8 
1996 5.9 
1997 5.6 
1998 8.1 
1999 0.3 
2000 1.6 
2001 1.6 
2002 0.7 
2003 1.8 
2004 2.7 
 
Source:   Bank of Thailand (2005). Thailand’s Key Economic Indicators.  
 
 
 
As regards to international trade after the financial crisis in 1997, the country 
enjoyed surplus earnings in both the trade balance and balance of payments. 
The devaluation of the Thai baht was a major factor contributing to the surplus. 
As exports became relatively cheaper, imports became more expensive.  The 
lower investments since the crisis also resulted in lower imports of intermediate 
and capital goods.   
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Table 1.5:  External Account and Exchange Rate of Thailand, 1991-2004 
(billions US$) 
 
Year Export Import Trade Balance 
Balance of 
Payments 
Exchange Rate 
(Baht/US$) 
1991 28.3 37.8 -9.5 4.2 25.5 
1992 32.2 40.1 -7.9 3.0 25.4 
1993 36.6 45.1 -8.5 3.9 25.3 
1994 44.7 53.4 -8.7 4.2 25.2 
1995 55.7 70.4 -14.7 7.2 24.9 
1996 54.7 70.8 -16.1 2.2 25.3 
1997 56.7 61.3 -4.6 -10.6 31.4 
1998 52.9 40.7 12.2 1.7 41.4 
1999 56.8 47.5 9.3 4.6 37.8 
2000 67.9 62.4 5.5 -1.6 40.2 
2001 63.1 60.6 2.5 1.3 44.5 
2002 66.1 63.4 2.7 4.2 43.0 
2003 78.1 74.3 3.8 0.1 41.5 
2004 95.0 93.5 1.5 5.7 40.3 
 
Source:   Bank of Thailand (2005). Thailand’s Key Economic Indicators. 
 
 
 
It is evident from Table 1.5 that the Thai economy suffered a trade deficit 
between 1991 and 1997. Since 1998, Thailand experienced a trade surplus 
due to the devaluation of baht. However, in the year 2000, the country again 
suffered a balance of payments deficit due to the need to service public debt 
from IMF.  
 
It is obvious that the 1997 economic crisis had adversedly affected the rate of 
unemployment in Thailand. In 1998, it shot up to 4.4 percent compared to a 
mere 1.5 percent in 1997. However, with the expansion in non agricultural 
sectors such as the hotel and the construction industries, the employment rate 
declined to 3.1 percent during 1999-2003.  
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Table 1.6:  Unemployment Rate in Thailand, 1990-2003 
 
Year Rate of Unemployment (%) 
1990-1996 2.4 
1997 1.5 
1998 4.4 
1999-2003 3.1 
 
Source:  National Statistical Office, Thailand (2004). Report of the Labour 
Force Survey. 
 
 
In response to labour union demand, the Thai government began setting a 
minimum wage in 1973. Table 1.7 shows the minimum wage rate in the Thai 
economy from 1994 to 2005. In 1994, the minimum wage set by the 
government was 135 baht per day. The minimum wage remained stagnant 
between the periods 1996-1997, 1998-2000, 2001-2002 and 2003-2004. By the 
year 2005, it had only increased by 40 baht compared to that of 1994. 
 
Table 1.7:  Minimum Wage in the Thai Economy, 1994-2005 (Baht per day) 
 
Year Wage 
1994 135 
1995 145 
1996 157 
1997 157 
1998 162 
1999 162 
2000 162 
2001 165 
2002 165 
2003 169 
2004 175 
2005 175 
 
Source:  Office of Wage Committee, Ministry of Labour (2005).  Minimum 
Wage in the Thai Economy. 
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Table 1.8 shows the interest rate in Thailand from 1990-2004. It is obvious that 
the interest rate between 1990 and 1998 was extremely high (10.5-16.3 
percent). The reason may be due to tight monetary policy. The Thai 
government decided to bring down the interest rate in order to boost economic 
activities and increase domestic spending. With the Thai fiscal and monetary 
policies, the government decreased the interest rate on government bonds and 
the banks make loan easily available. The interest rate declined steadily since 
1999. By 2004, the rate had declined to just 5.6 percent. 
 
Table 1.8:  Interest Rates in Thailand, 1990-2004 
 
Year Interest Rate (%) 
1990 16.3 
1991 14.0 
1992 11.5 
1993 10.5 
1994 11.8 
1995 13.8 
1996 13.1 
1997 15.3 
1998 11.8 
1999 8.4 
2000 7.9 
2001 7.3 
2002 6.8 
2003 5.6 
2004 5.6 
 
Source:  Bank of Thailand (2005). Thailand’s Key Economic Indicators. 
 
 
 
 18
1.3    Structural Changes of the Thai Economy 
 
An understanding of the historical growth of the Thai economy is necessary in 
order to understand the structural changes of its economy. The Thai economy 
experienced its first structural change in 1855 when the Bowring Treaty was 
signed. One of the provisions of the Treaty was that Thailand had to open its 
economy. Rice became an important crop for export and Thailand became a 
major rice exporter. However, the open economy policy had adversely affected 
the domestic investors who found it difficult to compete with their foreign 
counterparts.  Thus, the policy of protection for the domestic industry was 
adopted.  However, the strategy of emphasizing domestic investment did not 
result in the desired level of industrialization.  This is partly because most 
businesses imported cheap merchandise from other countries rather than to 
produce them locally a higher cost.  Furthermore, during that time, almost all 
big business firms were state-led, if not owned by the government itself. 
Moreover, during 1965-1971, the main thrust of government policy was to 
promote democracy and eliminate communism which had made tremendous 
in-roads in the Thai rural society. One of the government strategies to eradicate 
poverty was to re-distribute wealth to the rural areas. The government began a 
strategy of relocating manufacturing industries to non-metropolitan areas. The 
Board of Investment (BOI) provided more fiscal incentives to local investors. 
There were many measures to attract investors including the provision of tax 
reduction. By 1971, Thailand achieved high investment growth. However, most 
of the investments were in import-substitution industries.  
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Between 1965 and 1972, the growth rate of the industrial sector slowed down 
because of the limited size of the domestic market.  There was a shift in 
government policy from promoting domestic-oriented to export-oriented 
industries. The government provided more incentives for export-oriented 
industries. Production for exports was given priority and importance. 
Furthermore, during the Sixth Development Plan (1987-1991), Thailand's 
economic goal was to achieve the status of a newly industrialized country 
(NIC).  The three major factors expected to generate economic growth were 
foreign markets, foreign direct investments and foreign tourists.  
 
 
Thailand is a developing country which has enjoyed rapid economic 
development in the last few decades.  In the earlier phases of development, the 
agricultural sector was the leading sector in the Thai economy.  In the 1960s 
and 1970s, agricultural output accounted for 38.0 percent and 27.0 percent of 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) respectively.  In contrast, the 
manufacturing sector accounted for 12.0 percent and 16.0 percent of the GDP 
for the corresponding periods.  Since 1855, the agricultural development has 
significantly influenced the level and pace of economic expansion in Thailand.  
The transformation of the Thai economy began in 1958, when the First 
Development Plan was initiated. The manufacturing and service sectors 
became important sectors contributing to economic growth. The rapid 
expansion in the manufacturing sector since the 1980s brought about by the 
government's growth-oriented industrialization policy led to the declining 
importance of the agricultural sector. The agricultural share in GDP decreased 
from 27 percent in 1970 to 20.6 percent in 1980. In contrast, the manufacturing 
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sector's share in GDP increased from 16 percent in 1970 to 21.7 percent in 
1980, thus assuming the leading role in driving economic growth.  By 2003, the 
agricultural sector's share has further declined to 10.2 percent while 
manufacturing’s share has increased to 38.4 percent (see Table 1.9).  Despite 
these structural changes, Thailand is still a predominantly agricultural country. 
Farmers living in the rural areas still form a significant proportion of the 
population.    
 
Table 1.9:  Share of Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1960 to 2003 
(percent) 
 
Year Agriculture Manufacturing Others 
1960 38.0 12.0 50.0 
1970 27.0 16.0 57.0 
1975 24.8 20.0 55.2 
1980 20.6 21.7 20.7 
1985 19.9 20.7 59.4 
1990 13.5 27.8 58.7 
1995 10.7 31.0 58.3 
1996 10.6 31.4 58.0 
1997 10.5 32.5 57.0 
1998 11.5 32.2 56.3 
1999 11.3 34.7 54.0 
2000 11.3 35.2 53.5 
2001 10.4 36.5 53.1 
2002 9.9 38.4 51.7 
2003 10.2 39.3 50.5 
 
Source:  NESDB (2004), National Income Statistics of Thailand, New Series, 
1970-2003. 
 
 
 
The structural change in the economy in terms of output in different sectors, 
however, did not result in a corresponding change in labour structure. 
According to Takei (2002), the agricultural sector had the largest share of the 
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labour force and employment in the Thai economy for the period of 1960-2004 
(see Table 1.10).  
 
Table 1.10:  Population, and Labour Force in Thailand, 1960 to 2004 
(million persons) 
 
Year Population Total Labour Force 
Labour Force 
in Agriculture 
% of Labour Force 
in Agriculture 
1960 26.26 13.50 11.33 82.40 
1970 34.40 16.65 13.20 79.30 
1980 44.82 22.52 15.94 70.80 
1985 51.80 26.13 18.12 69.30 
1990 54.55 30.84 19.73 64.00 
1991 57.37 32.65 19.49 59.69 
1992 58.03 33.01 19.68 59.63 
1993 58.34 32.84 18.24 55.55 
1994 59.10 32.58 17.96 55.12 
1995 59.46 33.00 16.93 51.30 
1996 60.63 34.48 19.99 57.97 
1997 60.81 34.85 20.02 57.44 
1998 61.45 35.22 19.96 56.67 
1999 61.66 35.60 19.84 55.73 
2000 61.88 35.97 19.32 53.71 
2001 62.31 36.34 13.61 37.45 
2002 63.46 34.25 14.04 40.99 
2003 64.00 34.85 13.88 39.83 
2004 65.08 35.82 13.63 38.05 
 
Source:  National Statistical Office. Report of the Labour Force Survey, 
various issues. 
 
Note:  Before 1988, the labour force was defined as those between 11-60 
years old; from 1988-1995, it was defined as those between 13-60 
years old; and since 1996, it was redefined as those between 15-60 
years old.   
 
 
 
The proportion of the total labour force in agriculture sector was 82.4 percent in 
1960, 79.3 percent in 1970, 70.8 percent in 1980, 64.0 percent in 1990 and 
38.1 percent in 2004.  While in most Southeast Asian countries, the labour 
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force had shifted to non-agricultural sectors, in Thailand, more than 60 percent 
of its labour force were still engaged in the agricultural sector in 1990 (Saker, 
1996: 194). Although the proportion has been declining, nevertheless, during 
2001-2004 around 39.08 percent of the labour forces still worked in the 
agricultural sector. A major reason why the proportion of labour force in 
agriculture has been declining from 2001 and 2003-2004 are due to a drought 
during this period. During the Eighth Development Plan period (1997-2001), the 
agricultural sector contributed around 40 percent of the total employment in the 
country. This is shown in Table 1.11. 
 
Table 1.11:  Employment by Sector in Thailand, 1960-2003 (percent) 
 
Year Agriculture Manufacturing Others 
1960 82.3 3.4 14.3 
1970 79.3 4.1 16.6 
1971 77.8 5.6 16.6 
1975 73.0 7.5 19.5 
1980 70.7 7.9 21.4 
1985 68.9 7.9 23.2 
1986 64.0 9.1 26.9 
1987 60.0 11.0 29.0 
1989 60.65 11.06 28.29 
1990 63.95 10.16 25.89 
1991 54.00 13.18 32.82 
1992 53.34 13.57 33.09 
1993 53.03 13.62 33.35 
1994 48.06 14.61 37.33 
1995 46.70 14.95 38.35 
1996 44.27 15.15 40.58 
1997 45.12 14.63 40.25 
1998 44.83 15.12 40.05 
1999 45.39 14.96 39.65 
2000 44.52 15.92 39.56 
2001 42.20 15.90 41.90 
2002 43.20 14.70 42.10 
2003 41.20 15.20 43.60 
 
Source:   National Statistical Office, Thailand Labour Force Survey, various 
years. 
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It is evident from Table 1.11 that in 2003, around 41.20 percent of total 
employment were in the agricultural sector compared with 15.20 percent in the 
manufacturing sector.  Further, the Bank of Thailand (2003) reported that the 
growth rate of employment was 1 percent while output grew at 2 percent in the 
industrial sector in 2002-2003. It can be noted that the growth of the industrial 
sector did not lead to a growth in employment. There are many reasons for this.  
Firstly, the government implemented a number of tax incentives, which were 
biased towards the use of capital. Industrial investors were exempted from 
paying taxes for three years and the tax for goods and machines imported was 
reduced. With these incentives, the investors preferred the use of machines 
rather than employing labour.  Secondly, most products which were meant for 
export must meet minimum standards of quality. Machines and capital intensive 
production could help meet these standards.  Finally, most of the workers who 
moved from the rural areas to the industrial sector were unskilled labour. They 
had low levels of education, little experience with factory jobs and thus had 
limited abilities to contribute to the industrial sector. Thailand Development and 
Research Institution (TDRI, 1998) reported that 60 percent of the labour force 
had only primary school education. Those who completed secondary and 
tertiary education constituted 16 and 12 percent respectively. It can be seen 
that an increase in investment may not necessarily bring about a proportionate 
increase in employment. Between 2000 and 2004, the rate of investment 
increased at an average 7.90 percent while the growth rate of employment in 
non-agricultural sectors was only at 4 percent. 
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The population growth during 1990-2001 averaged 1.22 percent per year and 
has declined to 0.04 percent per year during 2001-2004. The labour force in 
Thailand experienced an average growth of 1.92 percent per year during 1990-
2001 and also has declined by 3.75 percent per year during 2001-2003.  It may 
be due to the successful implementation of family planning policy which 
discouraged large families. As a result, the population between 15-60 years old 
has declined. Between 1990-1996, an average 57.43 percent of the labour 
force were in the agricultural sector.  In 1997, of the total labour force of 34.85 
million, 57.43 percent were in the agricultural sector. This is due to the impact 
of the financial crisis, which caused workers to move back to the agricultural 
sector. Since 1998, the proportion of the labour force in agriculture had started 
to decline. This was partly attributed to the government’s policies which 
provided more incentives for investment and employment in the non-
agricultural sectors. It is clear that the financial crisis resulted in a decline in 
employment in the manufacturing and non agricultural sectors.   
 
During the harvesting seasons between 1991/92 and 1995/96, the number of 
families in the agricultural sector increased by 0.58 percent per year (Office of 
Agriculture Economics, Thailand, 2000).  In 1995/1996, there were as many as 
5.25 million agricultural families (see Table 1.12).  By the year 1998/1999, the 
number of farming families had gone up to 6.61 million families, an increase of 
26 percent.  The increase in the number of agricultural families during this 
period may be due to the financial crisis of 1997.  This crisis resulted in the high 
rate of unemployment in non-agricultural sectors and a large number of them 
moved back to the agricultural sector. However, the number of agricultural 
